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This article considers the future of judicial analytics, its possible effects for the 
public, the judiciary and the legal profession, and potential responses to the rise 
of judicial analytics in Canada. Judicial analytics involves the use of advanced 
technologies, like machine learning and natural language processing, to quickly 
analyze publicly-available data about judges and judicial decision-making. While, 
in Canada, judicial analytics tools are as yet at the early stages of development 
and use, such tools are likely to become more powerful, more accurate and more 
accessible in the near-to-medium future, resulting in unprecedented public insight 
into judges and the work of judging. This article identifies benefits of mainstreamed 
judicial analytics, including increased transparency into the work of judging, 
and risks flowing from the rise of judicial analytics, including the propagation of 
inaccurate or misleading information about judges. In light of these benefits and 
risks, the article identifies voluntary third-party certification and the production of 
credible public tools as meaningful responses to the rise of judicial analytics and 
calls on judicial regulators to consider how information made available through 
judicial analytics tools may influence their work.
Cet article examine l’avenir de l’analyse judiciaire, ses effets possibles sur le 
public, la magistrature et la profession juridique, et les réponses possibles à la 
montée de l’analyse judiciaire au Canada. L’analyse judiciaire implique l’utilisation 
de technologies avancées, comme l’apprentissage automatique et le traitement 
du langage naturel, pour analyser rapidement les données accessibles au public 
au sujet des juges et des décisions judiciaires. Bien qu’au Canada, les outils 
d’analyse judiciaire n’en soient encore qu’aux premiers stades de développement 
et d’utilisation, il est probable que ces outils deviendront plus puissants, plus précis 
et plus accessibles dans un avenir proche ou moyen, ce qui permettra au public 
d’avoir une vision sans précédent des juges et de leur travail. Cet article identifie 
les avantages de l’analyse judiciaire généralisée, notamment la transparence 
accrue du travail des juges, et les risques découlant de l’essor de l’analyse 
judiciaire, notamment la propagation d’informations inexactes ou trompeuses au 
sujet des juges. À la lumière de ces avantages et de ces risques, l’article identifie 
la certification volontaire par une tierce partie et la production d’outils publics 
crédibles comme des réponses significatives à l’essor de l’analyse judiciaire et 
appelle les régulateurs judiciaires à considérer comment les informations rendues 
disponibles par les outils d’analyse judiciaire peuvent influencer leur travail.
* Jena McGill and Amy Salyzyn are Associate Professors at the University of Ottawa, Faculty 
of Common Law. The authors would like to thank Benjamin Alarie, Jane Bailey, Jacquelyn Burkell, 
Jonathan Khan and two anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts. This 
article was prepared with financial support from the Ontario Early Researchers Award program and 
the SSHRC-funded Autonomy Through Cyberjustice Technologies (ACT) project.
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Introduction
I. What is judicial analytics?
II. The limits of current legal analytics tools
III. The rise of mainstreamed judicial analytics





V. Responses to judicial analytics
1. Should judicial analytics tools be regulated?




In 2019, the French government passed an unprecedented law that banned 
the public from analyzing information in reported court decisions to draw 
insights about the judicial behaviour of individual judges.1 The penalty 
for breaking this law is steep: five years in prison.2 The law has broad 
application, and it will limit the uses that academic researchers, legal 
technology companies, law firms and members of the general public can 
make of publicly available court information. 
The French ban follows previous legal provisions enacted in 2016 to 
make French case law more accessible to the public, as part of broader open 
data and digital governance reforms.3 The resulting increased availability 
1. LOI n° 2019-222 du 23 mars 2019 de programmation 2018–2022 et de réforme pour la 
justice (1), 24 March 2019, Article 33, online: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/article_jo/
JORFARTI000038261761?r=Xox7hUcdZ5> [https://perma.cc/4CFL-4GTQ]; as translated by 
Rebecca Loescher, a professor of French at St. Edward’s University in France, and reported in Jason 
Tashea “France bans publishing of judicial analytics and prompts criminal penalty” (7 June 2019), 
online: ABA Journal <http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/france-bans-and-creates-criminal-
penalty-for-judicial-analytics> [https://perma.cc/34GU-Y7HW]: the law reads: “No personally 
identifiable data concerning judges or court clerks may be subject to any reuse with the purpose or 
result of evaluating, analyzing or predicting their actual or supposed professional practices.”
2. Ibid. 
3. LOI n° 2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016, JO, 8 October 2016, pour une République numérique, 
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of public data made it relatively easy to model how individual judges 
decide certain types of matters, potentially exposing them to comparison 
with their fellow judges and criticism or allegations of bias.4 For example, 
using a non-commercial analytics tool of his own creation, a French tax 
lawyer published a report concluding that, based on the publicly available 
data, “some judges had a very high asylum rejection ratio (close to 100 per 
cent, with hundreds of cases per year) while others from the same court 
had a very low ratio.”5 The 2019 ban purports to “turn off the data spigot 
by banning the use of public information to ‘assess, analyze, compare 
or predict’ how judges make decisions.”6 Officially, the ban was justified 
on the basis that permitting judicial profiling could lead to undesirable 
pressures on judicial decision-making and strategic behaviour by litigants.7 
Critics have argued that the ban was motivated by the desire of judges to 
avoid scrutiny and accountability.8
In our view, a French-style ban is not normatively defensible in 
Canada given our constitutional protection of freedom of expression and 
Article 21 (France).
4. “France bans Judge Analytics, 5 Years in Prison for Rule Breakers” (4 June 2019), online: 
Artificial Lawyer <https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2019/06/04/france-bans-judge-analytics-5-
years-in-prison-for-rule-breakers/> [perma.cc/VDZ2-GES7]. 
5. Michaël Benesty, “The Judge Statistical Data Ban—My Story—Michaël Benesty” (7 June 
2019), online: Artificial Lawyer <https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2019/06/07/the-judge-statistical-
data-ban-my-story-michael-benesty/> [https://perma.cc/3UWP-3RLR]. 
6. Michael Livermore & Dan Rockmore, “France kicks data scientists out of its courts,” Slate (21 
June 2019), online: <https://slate.com/technology/2019/06/france-has-banned-judicial-analytics-to-
analyze-the-courts.html> [https://perma.cc/WEW9-VXR8].
7. See, for example, France, Conseil Constitutionnel, Loi de programmation 2018–2022 et de 
réforme pour la justice, Décision n° 2019-778 DC <https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/rapport-
activite-2019-numerique/dc-2019-778.php> [https://perma.cc/Y55G-T7XB], the report from 
France’s Constitutional Council, stating at para. 93: “En prévoyant que les données d’identité des 
magistrats et des membres du greffe figurant dans les décisions de justice mises à disposition du 
public par voie électronique ne peuvent faire l’objet d’une réutilisation ayant pour objet ou pour effet 
d’évaluer, d’analyser, de comparer ou de prédire leurs pratiques professionnelles réelles ou supposées, 
le législateur a entendu éviter qu’une telle réutilisation permette, par des traitements de données 
à caractère personnel, de réaliser un profilage des professionnels de justice à partir des décisions 
rendues, pouvant conduire à des pressions ou des stratégies de choix de juridiction de nature à altérer 
le fonctionnement de la justice,” which translates to: “By providing that personally identifiable 
data concerning judges or court clerks appearing in court decisions made available to the public by 
electronic means cannot be reused with the purpose or effect of evaluating, analyzing, comparing or 
predicting their real or supposed professional practices, the legislator intended to prevent judicial 
profiling which could lead to pressures on judges or strategies of choice of jurisdiction likely to alter 
the functioning of justice.”
8. See e.g. Simon Taylor, “French Data Analytics Law Won’t Stop Analytics” (7 June 2019), 
online: LegalWeek <https://www.law.com/legal-week/2019/06/07/french-data-analytics-law-wont-
stop-analytics/> [https://perma.cc/5LEF-6ZX5]. For a less critical viewpoint, see Florence G’sell, 
“Predicting courts’ decisions is lawful in France and will remain so” (24 June 2019), online: Blog de 
Florence G’sell <https://gsell.tech/predicting-courts-decisions-is-lawful-in-france-and-will-remain-
so/> [https://perma.cc/6Z8H-MYYY].
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our strong open courts principle. The public should be able to analyze 
information that is in the public domain. To give a stark example of what a 
French-style ban would mean in Canada: a person could face prison time if 
they produced a report that contained statistics comparing how often each 
judge of the Supreme Court of Canada wrote a dissent in any given year. 
We do believe, however, that Canada—like France—faces important 
questions about how to respond to the fast-growing field of judicial 
analytics. 9 Although studying judges is not new, judicial analytics tools 
allow for much faster and more powerful analysis of large amounts of 
information. Judicial analytics tools for public use already exist but, for 
reasons we explain later in the article, such tools are likely to become 
even more powerful and readily accessible in the near-to-medium future. 
This will result in unprecedented public insight into judges and the work 
of judging. We term this phenomenon “mainstreamed judicial analytics.”
It is this future world of mainstreamed judicial analytics that is the 
focus of our article. What will happen in a world where technology allows 
us to instantaneously draw up a detailed profile of a judge’s past behaviour 
with a click of a smartphone button? What will happen when we have a 
plethora of “stats” on how judges react to particular types of litigants, 
lawyers, legal arguments or even individual words? What will happen 
when we can pull up reports on how a judge’s behaviour may be impacted 
by the day of the week, time of day or even the weather? Motivated by 
these questions, this article provides an analysis of the future of judicial 
analytics, its likely impacts, and potential responses to the rise of this 
technology in Canada. 
We conclude that the key potential benefit of mainstreamed judicial 
analytics is significantly increased transparency into the work of judging. 
Such transparency could provide an opportunity for the public to better 
critique and more effectively operate within the justice system. Also, judges 
could use information produced by judicial analytics tools to reflect on and 
improve upon their practices, where needed. Meaningful transparency, 
however, is not a guaranteed output. Some practical complications to 
producing high-quality information will remain even with “mainstreamed” 
tools. We also identify potential risks resulting from increased surveillance 
of judges, including the potential for unwanted strategic behaviour and 
negative impacts on judges’ health and well-being. Finally, we note that 
9. Our focus is on “judicial analytics” given that existing tools and commentary tend to focus 
on analyzing patterns in judicial decision-making. We acknowledge, however, that most, if not all, 
of our arguments would apply to analytics of other adjudicative processes, including administrative 
tribunals. 
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lawyers and judges will need to become familiar with this technology in 
order to competently perform their jobs. 
This article is organized in five parts. In Part I, we describe the 
technology at the heart of judicial analytics and identify the types of 
information that analytics tools can reveal about judges and judging. 
In Parts II and III, we acknowledge some limitations of current legal 
analytics tools, and explain why it is likely that judicial analytics tools 
will become more powerful and widely available—“mainstreamed”—in 
the near-to-medium future. In Part IV, we consider the possible effects of 
mainstreamed judicial analytics tools for three justice system stakeholder 
groups: the public, the judiciary and the legal profession. In Part V, we 
look to responses to judicial analytics, highlighting voluntary third-party 
certification and the production of credible public tools as possible means 
of mitigating some of the risks inherent in judicial analytics. We also call 
on judicial regulators to consider how information made available through 
mainstreamed judicial analytics tools may influence their work.
I. What is judicial analytics?
Broadly speaking, analytics is the process “of discovering and 
communicating the meaningful patterns which can be found in data.”10 
There are different categories of analytics: (1) descriptive analytics, 
which focus on “gathering, organizing, tabulating and depicting data”; 
(2) predictive analytics, where data is used to “predict future courses of 
action”; and (3) prescriptive analytics, which offers “recommendations on 
future courses of action.”11
Excitement about analytics is closely tied to the emergence of “big 
data.” Big data refers not only to the vast amount of data available in a 
digitalized world, but also the technical capacity to do meaningful things 
with this data:
[W]hat makes Big data a new and interesting phenomenon in the world…
is not its volume alone, but the fact that we are able to “mine” large 
data sets using new and advanced techniques to uncover unexpected 
relationships, patterns and categories within these data sets…12 
10. “Definition—What does Analytics mean?” (last modified 20 February 2017), online: Techopedia 
<https://www.techopedia.com/definition/30296/analytics> [https://perma.cc/Q6JQ-89TP]. 
11. Thomas H Davenport & Jinho Kim, Keeping up with the Quants: Your Guide to Understanding 
and Using Analytics (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, 2013) at 3.
12. Bennett B Borden & Jason R Baron, “Finding the Signal in the Noise: Information Governance, 
Analytics, and the Future of Legal Practice” (2014) 20 Richmond JL & Technology 7 at 16.
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The availability of techniques like machine learning13 and natural 
language processing14 have allowed for the development of more powerful 
analytics tools. These techniques have made it possible to quickly find 
patterns in, and predict outcomes from, large amounts of data in ways that 
are simply not possible with the human mind alone or by using simpler 
technologies. 
Analytics is now used in many different industries and fields. For 
example, the film Moneyball, and the book upon which it is based, address 
the use of analytics in baseball.15 As digitized court data has become 
increasingly available to the public, the application of analytics tools to 
legal data—legal analytics—has grown apace. Legal analytics generally 
involves,
…mining data contained in case documents and docket entries, and then 
aggregating that data to provide previously unknowable insights into the 
behavior of the individuals (judges and lawyers), organizations (parties, 
courts, law firms), and the subjects of lawsuits (such as patents) that 
populate the litigation ecosystem.16
The commercial potential of legal analytics tools has led long-time legal 
research providers like LexisNexis and Westlaw to acquire and develop 
their own products,17 while start-ups like Loom Analytics and Blue J Legal 
compete in the emerging Canadian legal analytics market.18 The United 
States boasts significantly more legal analytics tools than Canada,19 and, as 
13. Law Society of Ontario, Technology Taskforce Update Report (November 29, 2019), online: 
<https://lawsocietyontario.azureedge.net/media/lso/media/about/convocation/2019/convocation-
november-2019-technologytaskforce-report.pdf>: “Machine Learning” refers to when a tool “uses 
algorithms to parse data, learn from it, and then make a determination or a prediction based on it.” at 8.
14. Ibid: “Natural language processing” involves “deriv[ing] useful meaning from written and 
spoken language by drawing connections between words and phrases.” at 8. 
15. Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (New York: WW Norton & 
Company, 2004).
16. Owen Byrd, “Legal Analytics vs Legal Research: What’s the Difference?” (12 June 2015), 
online: Law Technology Today, <https://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2017/06/legal-analytics-vs-
legal-research/> [https://perma.cc/2KUG-66DQ].
17. See e.g. Robert Ambrogi, “LexisNexis Launches Lexis Analytics, Putting a ‘Stake in the 
Ground’ to Claim the Legal Analytics Space” (13 July 2018), online: Law Sites <https://www.
lawsitesblog.com/2018/07/lexisnexis-launches-lexis-analytics-putting-stake-ground-claim-legal-
analytics-space.html> [https://perma.cc/MW87-P2R5]; Robert Ambrogi, “Move Over Westlaw: Meet 
the Next-Generation Westlaw Edge, with Advanced AI and Analytics” (12 July 2018), online: Law 
Sites <https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2018/07/move-westlaw-meet-next-generation-westlaw-edge-
advanced-ai-analytics.html> [https://perma.cc/EF6C-AD36].
18. Loom Analytics, online: <https://www.loomanalytics.com> [https://perma.cc/TVD4-2CVE]; 
Blue J Legal, online: <https://www.bluejlegal.com/ca> [https://perma.cc/Y8S5-QEDC].
19. Examples of tools available in the American market include: Lexis Analytics, online: <https://
www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexis-analytics.page> [https://perma.cc/64T5-4J73]; Westlaw 
Edge, online: <https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/announcing-westlaw-edge> 
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the French ban suggests, the market in legal analytics is growing quickly 
in Europe, too.20 
Judicial analytics—also referred to as judge analytics or court 
analytics—is a sub-category of legal analytics. Tools that are marketed 
under this title involve the specific application of analytics technologies 
to judges and judicial decision-making. One of the outcomes of judicial 
analytics is “judge profiling,” which involves “the monitoring and 
prediction of the behavior of judges.”21 Providers of judicial analytics 
tools promote the ability of their tools to provide users with information 
on topics including:
• the language, precedents and other judges that a particular judge 
finds the most compelling;22
• the “specific logic” that a judge tends to use when granting or 
denying a particular type of motion;23
• how likely a user’s case is to prevail before a particular judge;24
• how long a particular judge takes to decide a certain type of 
motion;25
• how a particular judge tends to rule on a particular type of case, like 
a summary judgment motion;26
• how often a judge is affirmed or reversed (in whole or in part) on 
appeal;27 and 
• “outcome analysis by gender and race.”28 
[https://perma.cc/HM7K-H6XU]; Bloomberg Law, online: <https://pro.bloomberglaw.com/ai-
analytics/> [https://perma.cc/3SKY-AWUM]; Gavelytics, online: <https://www.gavelytics.com/> 
[https://perma.cc/V2YL-EKN2]; and Premonition Analytics LLC, online: <https://premonition.ai/
about-us/> [https://perma.cc/66XF-FZT4].
20. Bart Jan van Ettekoven & Corien Prins, “Data Analysis, Artificial Intelligence and the Judiciary 
System” in Vanessa Mak, Eric Tjong Tjin Tai & Anna Berlee, eds, Research Handbook in Data 
Science and Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2018) 425 at 426 (note that European legal analytics 
tools include, e.g. lexiq.nl; legalloyd.com, kenedict.com/rodeo).
21. Ibid at 427. 




25. “Westlaw Edge: Litigation Analytics” online: Westlaw <https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/
products/westlaw/edge/litigation-analytics> [https://perma.cc/2VS9-LZCD].
26. Ibid.
27. See e.g. Bloomberg Law, online: <https://pro.bloomberglaw.com/> [https://perma.cc/3AM5-
4WPC].




256 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Most judicial analytics tools also offer a comparative function, where 
statistics on an individual judge can be compared against other judges or 
a court average.29 
Not all judicial analytics tools are commercial products geared toward 
lawyers and law firms. Academic researchers have also built judicial 
analytics tools to conduct their own empirical analyses of judicial decision-
making.30 In general, the judicial analytics tools used in academic settings 
are tailor-made for specific research projects and generate narrow, albeit 
interesting and important, results.31 These non-commercial tools are not 
widely available for public use.
Reporting on patterns in judicial decision-making is not new. 
Academics have been doing this for decades without the benefit of analytics 
technology.32 Judicial analytics tools, however, can radically decrease the 
resources required for such analyses and may yield insights that would 
be inaccessible using human cognition or traditional technologies. The 
difference that technological intervention can make in empirical studies of 
judges is evident in a comparison of Sean Rehaag’s two studies of refugee 
29. See e.g. Bloomberg Law, “Comparative Analytics tool” online: Bloomberg Law <https://
help.bloomberglaw.com/docs/blh-030-litigation-intelligence-center.html> [https://perma.cc/PX9H-
9GZE].
30. See e.g. Wolfgang Alschner, “The Computational Analysis of International Law” in Rossana 
Deplano & Nicholas Tsagourias, eds, Research Methods in International Law: A Handbook 
(forthcoming), available online at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3428762> 
[https://perma.cc/Y9UG-GFFU]; Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations (II): 
Revisiting the Luck of the Draw” Queen’s LJ (forthcoming), available online at: <https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3249723> [https://perma.cc/3H7S-L5BC] [Rehaag, “Revisiting 
Refugee Determinations”]; Nikolaos Aletras et al, “Predicting Judicial Decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights: A Natural Language Processing Perspective” (2016) 2 Peer J Comp Sci 92; 
although see also critique of the Aletras et al study in Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, “Prediction, 
Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Behaviorism” (2018) 68:1 UTLJ 63. In addition to the use of 
analytics tools to look at case law, there is a growing field of “legal text mining” where analytical tools 
are applied to other legal documents; see e.g. Wolfgang Alschner et al, “Text of Trade Agreements 
(ToTA)—A Structured Corpus for the Text‐As‐Data Analysis of Preferential Trade Agreements” 
(2018) 15:3 J Empirical Leg Stud 648.
31. For example, for his first study of decision-making in the refugee law context in Canada’s 
Federal Court, Sean Rehaag, supra note 30, wrote his own computer program and, for his second 
study, he revised code developed by another academic to study factors that influence outcomes in 
immigration law judicial reviews in a different jurisdiction.
32. Examples of Canadian studies that do not rely on judicial analytics technology include e.g. 
Vanessa MacDonnell, “Justice Suzanne Côté’s Reputation as a Dissenter on the Supreme Court of 
Canada” (2019) 88 SCLR (2d) 47; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew James Green, “The Reasonable Justice: 
An Empirical Analysis of Justice Frank Iacobucci’s Career on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 
57 UTLJ 195; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew James Green, “Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Voting” 
(19 December 2017), draft available on SSRN: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3090789> [https://perma.cc/3X6X-BXZP]; and Bruce Ryder, Cidalia C Faria & Emily Lawrence, 
“What’s Law Good For?: An Empirical Overview of Charter Equality Rights Decisions” (2004) 24 
SCLR (2d) 103.
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law decision-making at Canada’s Federal Court.33 In Rehaag’s first study, in 
2012, he conducted a quantitative empirical assessment of 23,000 Federal 
Court applications for leave to review refugee determinations.34 The 2012 
study provided important insight into judicial decision-making in this 
context, concluding that “these applications often hinged on which judge 
was assigned to decide whether to grant leave, with the leave grant rates 
of individual judges ranging from 1% to 77%.”35 Reaching this conclusion 
took hundreds of hours of time and human labour.36 Although a computer 
program was used to collect data from online dockets, the research team 
manually reviewed and coded the data.37 
Rehaag’s second study in 2018 provided an updated empirical analysis, 
with a view to looking at more recent data and assessing the impact of 
new measures adopted by the Federal Court to address variations in leave 
grant rates among judges.38 For the 2018 study, Rehaag adopted a different 
methodological approach, revising computer code developed by another 
academic to automate the manual review and code the data. This different 
methodology dramatically reduced the human labour required for the 
study.39 By using this advanced technology, Rehaag was able to conduct a 
comparable study with significantly fewer resources and in less time. As 
this example demonstrates, what is novel about judicial analytics is not so 
much what it can do; instead the novelty lies in the speed and ease with 
which judicial analytics tools can sift through huge data sets to extract 
pertinent information and insights.
The capacity of legal analytics tools to quickly generate new insights 
has led to significant excitement in the legal industry. For example, 
legal analytics tools have been branded “moneyball for lawyers” and 
characterized as having the potential to “disrupt” norms in legal practice.40 
In addition to the hype, there is evidence that lawyers are using these tools 
33. Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012) 38:1 
Queen’s LJ 1 [Rehaag, “Refugee Determinations]; and Rehaag, “Revisiting Refugee Determinations,” 
supra note 30.
34. Rehaag, “Revisiting Refugee Determinations,” supra note 30 at 2, summarizing the 2012 study 
from Rehaag, “Refugee Determinations,” supra note 33.
35. Rehaag, “Revisiting Refugee Determinations,” supra note 30. 
36. Ibid at 6.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid at 2.
39. Ibid at 6.
40. For blog and media takes, see e.g. Anne Tucker & Charlotte Alexander, “Why we’re training 
the next generation of lawyers in big data” (2 October 2018), online: The Conversation <http://
theconversation.com/why-were-training-the-next-generation-of-lawyers-in-big-data-103196> 
[https://perma.cc/FB5P-X2L4]; Barney Thomson, “Big Data: Legal Firms play ‘Moneyball’” 
(6 February 2019), online: Financial Times <https://www.ft.com/content/ca351ff6-1a4e-11e9-9e64-
d150b3105d21> [https://perma.cc/8EMD-8ELM].
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in their practices.41 A 2020 Legal Analytics Study, conducted by ALM 
Intelligence in collaboration with LexisNexis, surveyed 163 large law firm 
professionals and reported that 70 per cent of law firms surveyed were 
using legal analytics.42 While determining the exact size of the market for 
legal analytics tools—including the sub-set of judicial analytics tools—is 
difficult, it is clear that this is not a fringe technology but rather it is one 
with rapidly growing use, at least among certain segments of the legal 
profession.
II. The limits of current legal analytics tools 
Notwithstanding the excitement and increased use of legal analytics, it is 
important to address the limits of existing analytics tools. 
First, there are limits in what is covered in the available data set. Not all 
judicial behaviour is recorded and not all court records are made available in 
digital format, such that they can be readily inputted into judicial analytics 
tools. Many court decisions are not publicly reported, either because a 
judge issues oral reasons, gives no reasons at all, or the written reasons 
are not provided to a public or commercial database. Likewise, not all 
proceedings are transcribed and even where proceedings are transcribed, 
it can be very difficult and costly to access transcripts.43 Finally, court 
files—which contain materials such as the parties’ pleadings and written 
evidence in affidavit form and which might be combined with other sources 
of information to indirectly gain insights into judicial decision-making44—
are generally accessible only in hard copy, by attending a court house.45 
The incomplete nature of the data sets available to judicial analytics tools 
narrows the insights that such tools are able to produce. 
41. See generally Josh Becker, “Legal Analytics and the Evolving Practice of Law” (25 June 2020), 
online: Law.com <https://www.law.com/2020/06/25/legal-analytics-and-the-evolving-practice-of-
law/>.
42. LexisNexis, 2020 Legal Analytics Study: Bringing Value into Focus (LexisNexis, 2020).
43. For an excellent overview of the difficulty and costs associated with obtaining court transcripts 
in Canada, see Kaila Scarrow, Becky Robinet & Julie Macfarlane, Is Access to Court Transcripts in 
Canada an A2J Issue?: Report prepared for the National Self-Represented Litigants Project (June 
2018), online: <https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1087&context=lawpub> 
[https://perma.cc/Y6E6-Y8RG].
44. For example, written arguments on an appeal could be combined with information from the 
ultimate decision and transcripts of the oral arguments to better understand what types of arguments or 
case law a judge tends to find persuasive.
45. For further discussion, see Jacquelyn Burkell & Jane Bailey, “Revisiting the Open Court 
Principle in an Era of Online Publication: Questioning Presumptive Public Access to Parties’ and 
Witnesses’ Personal Information” (2017) 48:1 Ottawa L Rev 147. Although these types of documents 
are not a direct record of judicial behaviour, in the same way that a court decision or a transcript of 
court proceeding would be, they can be combined with other sources of information to indirectly gain 
insights. 
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Second, data quality can affect the work of analytics. For example, even 
if a case is reported, it may contain a typo or misspelling which results in it 
being improperly included or excluded from a data set. Inconsistencies can 
also generate problems. For example, a judge’s name may be written in a 
variety of different formats, even in related decisions from the same court 
that are published within a short time frame.46 These types of issues within 
a data set can affect the quality of the insights generated by an analytics 
tool relying on that set. In the American context, the uneven quality of 
the data contained in the electronic public access service for federal court 
documents, PACER,47 has been identified as one of the most significant 
problems facing the legal analytics market.48
A third limitation arises from the fact that certain areas of law—where 
comparable matters are decided on a high-volume basis—may be more 
susceptible to statistical analysis than others. As Benjamin Alarie, Anthony 
Niblett and Albert H Yoon have observed, not all legal questions are well 
suited to the application of artificial intelligence: 
The temptation of artificial intelligence is to view it as a proverbial 
hammer where all the legal questions are nails. The law does not fit this 
paradigm. It is inappropriate in instances where the court’s determination 
of a legal question does not lend itself to an identifiable set of factors, or 
where insufficient data exist. Future developments may well be able to 
surmount these current challenges of limited data and inchoate context; 
time will tell.49
In other words, it will generally be easier to track trends in judicial 
decision-making across discrete and narrow decisions that are made in 
large numbers by courts—like granting bail or decisions to allow judicial 
review of refugee determinations—than to draw out statistically relevant 
46. This example is taken from an August 2019 tweet by legal research executive Colin LaChance, 
“Fun with legal data. Reviewing judgments with a view to normalizing judge name as data field and 
come across 3 related decisions of same judge, same court, same parties, all within a few months of 
each other—but judge’s name written 3 different ways. If only this were unusual.” (31 August 2019), 
online: Twitter (original tweet no longer available because author changed accounts but on file with 
authors, who have also obtained permission to refer to the tweet in this article).
47. PACER is the acronym for Public Access to Court Electronic Records. It is managed by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and contains case and docket information from the 
United States district, appellate and bankruptcy courts. See PACER online: <https://www.pacer.gov/> 
[https://perma.cc/MV53-DD8L].
48. Jean O’Grady, “What Do Law Firms Need to Know About Purchasing Litigation Analytics 
Products?” (26 July 2019), online: Above the Law <https://abovethelaw.com/2019/07/what-do-law-
firms-need-to-know-about-purchasing-litigation-analytics-products/> [https://perma.cc/M4US-
69FS].
49. Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert H Yoon, “How Artificial Intelligence will Affect the 
Practice of Law” (9 November 2017), online: TSpace Research Repository <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3066816> [https://perma.cc/7X77-SXAZ] at 10.
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patterns within more amorphous categories of cases, like for example, 
comparing cases within the broad basket of “commercial disputes.” 
A fourth limitation relates to the capacity of analytics tools to read and 
analyze case law. Major challenges arise because case law is often highly 
“unstructured.”50 Judges do not follow a template or standard format in 
crafting their decisions.51 As a result, a reported legal decision does not 
neatly organize the relevant information into pre-set fields, unlike, for 
example, a well-designed electronic medical record.52 “While opinions 
follow a general form – recitation of facts, discussion of relevant case 
law, and application of law to the facts…,” a computer cannot simply look 
for a field in a legal decision titled “ratio” and extract this information 
for use in a data set.53 Compounding these challenges is the fact that each 
judge writes in their own “voice,” relying on unique language preferences 
and habits.54 Even gathering all cases on a single topic is not necessarily 
straightforward. An account of the founding of Lex Machina, a prominent 
American legal analytics company that was acquired by LexisNexis in 
2015, noted that, in preparing its original statistical database of intellectual 
property litigation decisions, “locating all cases related to patent 
infringement was complicated by the fact that the exact term didn’t always 
appear in a document’s text.”55 The net effect of these issues is that judicial 
analytics tools often rely heavily on humans to manually extract relevant 
data from the cases and/or to review initial computer-generated results.56 
In the case of Lex Machina, “it took the team about 100 000 hours” to 
“manually sort through, categorize, and correct the data” to develop its 
statistical database.57 This human labour translates into significant front-
end costs when developing judicial analytics tools.58
50. For a detailed overview of the lack of standardization in Canadian legal decisions, see 
Jon Khan “The Life of a Reserve: How Might We Improve the Structure, Content, Accessibility, 
Length & Timeliness of Judicial Decisions?” (Master of Laws (LL.M) thesis, University of 
Toronto, Faculty of Law, 2019) [unpublished]), available online: <https://tspace.library.utoronto.
ca/bitstream/1807/98120/1/Khan_Jon_%20_201911_LLM_thesis.pdf> [https://perma.cc/VEM2-
MSRR]).
51. Supra note 49 at 11.
52. This helpful comparison was taken from Khan, supra note 50 at 88.
53. The first part of this sentence is taken from Alarie, Niblett & Yoon, supra note 49.
54. Ibid at 10.
55. Tam Harbert, “The Law Machine,” IEEE Spectrum 50:11 (2013) 31 at 34. For details about the 
acquisition, see Lex Machina, “LexisNexis Acquires Premier Legal Analytics Provider Lex Machina” 
Lex Machina (23 November 2015), online: < https://lexmachina.com/media/press/lexisnexis-acquires-
lex-machina/>.
56. See e.g. the discussion in Kevin Ashley, Artificial Intelligence and Legal Analytics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 4 and Alarie, Niblett & Yoon, supra note 49 at 10-11.
57. Tam Harbert, “The Law Machine,” IEEE Spectrum 50:11 (2013) 31 at 34.
58. Supra note 49 at 11.
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A fifth limitation stems from the fact that judicial analytics tools are 
expensive to create: these costs are passed along to users, so not everyone 
can afford to access judicial analytics tools. Commercial tools charge 
user fees. Pricing for commercial legal analytics platforms is not readily 
accessible but extrapolating from what we know about commercial legal 
research tools, the costs likely run at several hundreds of dollars a month, 
at minimum, for individual users.59 While in some cases, access may be 
provided to academic institutions at no-cost or low-cost, free or subsidized 
access is not generally available.60 The costs associated with commercial 
tools are prohibitive for many, if not most, members of the general public.
III. The rise of mainstreamed judicial analytics
There are several reasons why judicial analytics tools are likely to improve 
significantly in the near-to-medium terms. The above limitations are not 
permanent, at least not in their current forms.
First, the available datasets are likely to increase in size and scope. 
Although courts have been notoriously slow to digitize their records, 
including judicial decisions, an increasing amount of past court material 
is being converted into digital format.61 An example of the scale at which 
digitization of court decisions is taking place is Harvard’s Case Law Access 
Project which “digitized over 40 million pages of U.S. court decisions…
transforming them into a dataset of over 6.7 million cases that represent 
360 years of U.S. legal history.”62 Additionally, biographical information 
about judges is increasingly available and may be used by judicial analytics 
tools in combination with court records to develop judicial profiles.63
In many respects, the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the 
digitization of court records and court processes. As the Attorney General 
of Ontario noted, “COVID was the catalyst that allowed us to move 
forward [on court modernizations] 25 years in 25 days.”64 Additionally, 
59. Bob Ambrogi, “Price Wars in Legal Research Mean Deals for Small Firms; I Compare Costs” 
LawSites (23 May 2019), online: Law Sites <https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2019/05/price-wars-in-
legal-research-mean-deals-for-small-firms-i-compare-costs.html> [https://perma.cc/3J2N-LRUF].
60. For example, Lex Machina states that it provides free access to “certain university and college 
faculty staff and students, directly engaged in research, or study of law and policy” for “public interest 
purposes,” online: <https://lexmachina.com/public-interest/> [https://perma.cc/DKT6-T73Q].
61. For a description of this trend, see e.g. Burkell & Bailey, supra note 45. 
62.  Project: Caselaw Access Project, online: <https://lil.law.harvard.edu/projects/caselaw-access-
project/> [https://perma.cc/4BMS-9SQZ].
63. For example, the Free Law Project, an American non-profit, has launched a Judge and Appointer 
Database that “includes biographical data about each person, the roles they have held before, during 
and after their time in the judicial branch, their political affiliations, their education, and any retention 
events that kept them in a judicial position (such as a reappointment),” online: <https://free.law/
judicial-database/> [https://perma.cc/K7M5-U547].
64. John Lancaster, “How COVID-19 helped push Ontario’s low-tech justice system into the 21st 
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to the extent that the COVID-19 pandemic has precipitated an increase 
in virtual hearings in the immediate and longer terms, it may be easier 
for judicial analytics tools to include oral decision-making and in-court 
behaviour (for example, the nature or frequency of questions from the 
bench) by judges into their datasets.65 If the recordings of virtual hearings 
are publicly accessible, it may eventually be possible to use automated 
transcription technologies to easily produce digital transcriptions of 
proceedings that can then be analyzed by judicial analytics tools.66 
Second, the technology is likely to continue to improve. Current 
functional limitations related to the ability of judicial analytics tools 
to “read” information in the data set are unlikely to be permanent. The 
available technology, while struggling with predictive tasks like modeling 
legal reasoning, is already good at one of the main functions behind 
judicial analytics: pattern recognition.67 The challenges of creating a tool 
that can easily “read” court decisions are complex but there have been 
significant technical advances in this area and experts seem confident that 
there are more to come. As Kevin Ashley observes in his book, Artificial 
Intelligence and Legal Analytics, there are several new techniques for 
analyzing text that hold promise for automatically, rather than manually, 
extracting information from legal texts.68 At the same time, there is growing 
discussion about publishing judicial decisions in open, machine-readable 
format and, thus, addressing at least some of the readability issues at their 
source.69
century,” CBC News (4 June 2020), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/covid-19-
technology-courts-ontario-1.5596643> [https://perma.cc/B59R-V5KV].
65. For discussion about the increased use of virtual court hearings in Canada as a result of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, see e.g. “COVID-19 and the courts: May 11 update” (11 May 2020), online: 
Canadian Lawyer Mag <https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/practice-areas/litigation/covid-19-
and-the-courts-may-11-update/329500> [https://perma.cc/6XTT-NNZU]; Sean Fine, “Supreme Court 
of Canada to hold virtual hearings in June” (7 May 2020), online: The Globe and Mail <https://www.
theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-supreme-court-of-canada-to-hold-virtual-hearings-in-june/> 
[https://perma.cc/U9AT-VVEP]; and Daniel Urbas, “Canadian Courts Employ Virtual Hearings” 
(15 April 2020), online: American Bar <https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/
alternative-dispute-resolution/practice/2020/canadian-courts-employ-vrtual-hearings/> [https://
perma.cc/P95C-JL5W]. 
66. For discussion on the emergence and capacity of automated transcription tools, see e.g. 
John Markoff, “From Your Mouth to Your Screen, Transcribing Takes the Next Step” (2 October 
2019), online: The New York Times <www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/technology/automatic-speech-
transcription-ai.html> [https://perma.cc/6C7V-KGMV]; and Greg Noone, “When AI Can Transcribe 
Everything” (20 June 2017), online: The Atlantic <www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/06/
automated-transcription/530973/> [https://perma.cc/8XKV-Q9DE]. 
67. Kenneth A. Grady, “What is the Potential of AI in the Legal Sector?” in The 2019 Aderant 
Business of Law and Legal Technology Survey at 23, online: <https://www.aderant.com/research/2019-
business-of-law-legal-technology-survey/> [https://perma.cc/7934-QPJC].
68. Supra note 56 at 4-5.
69. See e.g. Dr. Natalie Byrom, “Digital Justice: HMCTS data strategy and delivering access to 
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Third, as judicial analytics tools have access to more data and become 
more powerful from a technical standpoint, they will also likely become 
more accessible. The primary accessibility barrier is cost. However, as 
digital court records become universally available and directly readable 
by machines, the front-end costs of developing judicial analytics tools 
should decrease significantly.70 As the costs come down, tools that were 
previously the domain of “high-end” segments of the legal industry and 
pockets of the academy will become more easily accessible to the public.71 
These three probable developments, taken together, are the basis for 
our prediction that judicial analytics will become mainstreamed. It is 
this future world of “mainstreamed judicial analytics” that informs the 
remainder of our analysis.
IV. Effects of mainstreamed judicial analytics on the justice system and 
its stakeholders
What does the world of mainstreamed judicial analytics look like? This 
section focuses on this question, from three perspectives: that of the 
public, judges, and lawyers.
1. The public
If and when judicial analytics tools become more powerful and easily 
accessible to the public, broad public consequences are likely to follow. 
In this section, we consider the possibility that mainstreamed judicial 
analytics tools will result in increased transparency about the work of 
judging. We explore not only the benefits of such transparency but also 
the practical barriers to achieving meaningful transparency using tools of 
this type.
Canada prides itself on having court processes and outcomes that 
are open to the public. The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly 
stated that “[p]ublicity is the very soul of justice”72 and that open courts 
justice: Report and Recommendations” (October 2019) at 29, online: (pdf) The Legal Education 
Foundation <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/835778/DigitalJusticeFINAL.PDF> [https://perma.cc/RZ2B-XJYK].
70. This prediction, of course, depends on whether court records, once digitized, are also easily 
accessible in the “bulk” format needed for use in judicial analytics tools. For further discussion of this 
issue, see Addison Cameron-Huff, “Why Google Can’t Build A Case Law Search Engine in Ontario” 
(11 February 2014), online: Cameronhuff.com <https://www.cameronhuff.com/blog/ontario-case-law-
private/> [https://perma.cc/G3AF-TDBN].
71. Here, we might consider, Peter Diamandis’ “6Ds” framework of the growth cycle of exponential 
technology, explained, e.g. in Vanessa Bates Ramirez, “The 6 Ds of Tech Disruption: A Guide to 
the Digital Economy” (22 November 2016), online: Singularity Hub < https://singularityhub.
com/2016/11/22/the-6-ds-of-tech-disruption-a-guide-to-the-digital-economy/> [https://perma.cc/
L4GB-LQYB].
72. Attorney General of Nova Scotia v MacIntyre, [1982] 1 SCR 175, 132 DLR (3d) 385 at 183, 
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are “a hallmark of a democratic society.”73 In many important respects, the 
current openness of our courts generates meaningful transparency about our 
justice system: the public is generally permitted to attend court proceedings 
and a significant number of judicial decisions are reported and made 
easily available to the public. This openness, however, has not resulted in 
widespread, sophisticated understandings about how judges decide cases or 
act in courtrooms. The public has far greater access to statistics about the 
performance of professional athletes in a given season than about judges and 
their decisions. By providing the public with increased access to detailed 
information about judging, mainstreamed judicial analytics tools have the 
potential to provide increased insight into what judges do and how they do 
it. Armed with more information, the public can more effectively participate 
in, and critique, what is happening in the justice system.
How might mainstreamed judicial analytics tools facilitate public 
participation in the judicial system? Analytics companies already 
frequently claim that litigants can achieve better results when they know 
more about the particular judge adjudicating their case.74 For example, if 
a judicial analytics tool can highlight trends in the case law, arguments 
or language that a judge tends to prefer, then a litigant or their lawyer 
can tailor their submissions accordingly. Similarly, if a judicial analytics 
tool can highlight patterns in the types of questions that are asked by a 
particular judge, then the litigant or their lawyer can better prepare to 
argue their case in court.
Litigants may also use the information provided by judicial analytics 
tools to try to have a matter heard or not heard by a particular judge. It is 
possible that “judge shopping”—that is, attempting to have a case heard or 
not heard by a particular judge because of that judge’s record or reputation 
—may increase, where possible, if judicial analytics tools are more widely 
available. To date, our legal system has discouraged judge shopping on 
the basis of “concerns for the impartiality of the administration of justice, 
real and perceived.”75 But our legal system is also committed to the 
citing Jeremy Bentham, “Draught of a New Plan for the organisation of the Judicial Establishment in 
France: proposed as a Succedaneum to the Draught presented, for the same purpose, by the Committee 
of Constitution, to the National Assembly, December 21st, 1789” printed in London, 1790, 25-6 
(Bowring, iv. 285-406, at 316-317).
73. Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43 at para 23.
74. For example, the American judicial analytics company, Gavelytics, supra note 19, promises that 
its AI-generated reports on individual judges, which include information on a judge’s background, 
typical workload, and whether a judge rules more often for plaintiffs or defendants (called a 
“Gavelscore”), will help lawyers “win more business, position your case, and better manage client 
expectations.” 
75. R v Regan, 2002 SCC 12 at para 60; R v Scott, [1990] 3 SCR 979 116 NR 361 at pp 1008-1009.
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principle of equality before and under the law.76 A fundamental feature 
of equality requires judges to avoid relying on bias, stereotypes or other 
discriminatory beliefs in reaching their decisions.77 If a judicial analytics 
tool demonstrates that Judge A takes disproportionately punitive measures 
against members of a particular group, while controlling for other factors 
such as the merits of the case, how can a litigant who belongs to that group 
be criticized for trying to avoid having Judge A hear their case?
In addition to increased “judge shopping,” mainstreamed judicial 
analytics tools may also result in a surge in applications to have judges 
disqualified for a reasonable apprehension of bias. On such applications, 
courts are directed to apply “a strong presumption of judicial impartiality,” 
which has historically resulted in “a heavy burden on a party who seeks 
to rebut this presumption.”78 Judicial analytics tools have the potential to 
ease this burden. Notwithstanding the presumption of impartiality, the 
relevant test does not focus on actual proof of bias but rather on reasonable 
perceptions.79 What happens, then, when litigant B and their lawyer enter 
a courtroom armed with statistical reports from judicial analytics tools 
showing that the judge presiding over the case has a verifiable record of 
disproportionately disfavouring litigants similar to litigant B? Although, 
as Sean Rehaag has observed, “[c]ourts have regularly held that statistical 
differences in outcomes are not sufficient on their own to ground a finding 
of reasonable apprehension of bias,” we also agree with his conclusion 
that “there are…exceptional circumstances where statistical evidence 
is so overwhelming that it meets the test for a reasonable apprehension 
of bias.”80 Moreover, the amount and nature of evidence that may be 
76. Equality is embodied, inter alia, in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Freedoms, 
s 15, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) 1982, 
c 11, which guarantees: “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to 
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability” [Charter]. 
77. The ethical guidance for federally appointed judges posits: “Equality according to law is 
fundamental to justice and is strongly linked to judicial impartiality. Judges cannot reach correct 
results if they engage in stereotyping. Acting in this way compromises impartiality, real or perceived.” 
Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council), online 
(pdf): <https://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_judicialconduct_Principles_en.pdf> 
[https://perma.cc/PH96-TFTE].
78. Carby-Samuels II v Carby-Samuels, 2018 ONCA 664 at para 4.
79. See e.g. Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon (Attorney General), 
2015 SCC 25 at paras 20-25. In Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45 at para 66, the 
Supreme Court confirmed “the relevant inquiry is not whether there was in fact either conscious or 
unconscious bias on the part of the judge, but whether a reasonable person properly informed would 
apprehend that there was.”
80. Rehaag, “Refugee Determinations,” supra note 33 at 34, Law Depot <https://www.lawdepot.
ca/> [https://perma.cc/47LU-C3AN]..
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possible to marshal via mainstreamed judicial analytics tools is likely to 
fundamentally impact how reasonable apprehension of bias applications 
are approached and decided. 
At a systemic level, mainstreamed judicial analytics tools may change 
the kind and quantity of critiques of judges and the justice system. Both 
the impartiality and competence of judges are potential targets. 
In general terms, judicial impartiality “refers to a state of mind or 
attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and the parties in a particular 
case” and “connotes absence of bias, actual or perceived.”81 It is understood 
to be an essential feature of the proper functioning of our justice system 
and a core ethical obligation of judges.82 Judicial impartiality—both what it 
means and whether it can be or should be achieved—has been the subject of 
serious questions and critiques. Courts have grappled with articulating the 
relationship between judicial impartiality and neutrality.83 Legal scholars 
have canvassed the “unending difficulties in applying the theoretical 
demands for impartiality and disengagement” required of judges and have 
offered compelling critiques of the desirability of impartiality as a judicial 
ideal.84 Yet judicial impartiality, at least as an aspirational ideal, operates 
both rhetorically and doctrinally as a necessary condition for the proper 
functioning of our justice system. To provide two concrete examples: 
(1) the principle of judicial impartiality is constitutionally mandated in 
the criminal context; and (2) it is included as a requirement of procedural 
fairness in administrative contexts.85 
81. Valente v R, [1985] 2 SCR 673 at 685 24 DLR (4th) 161. 
82. According to former Chief Justice McLachlin, “[j]udges must maintain the appearance and 
reality of impartiality. It is impartiality that distinguishes us from the other branches of government, 
and impartiality that gives us our legitimacy.” The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, The Role of 
Judges in Modern Society, Remarks at the Fourth Worldwide Common Law Judiciary Conference (5 
May 2001), online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2001-05-05-eng.aspx> [https://
perma.cc/PKR4-7GQ7]; the ethical guidelines for federally appointed judges in Canada, supra note 
77, state, for example, that “judges must be and appear to be impartial in their performance of judicial 
duties.”
83. See e.g. R v S(RD), [1997] 3 SCR 484 at paras 34-35 151 DLR (4th) 193. 
84. Judith Resnik, “On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges” 
(1988) 61:6 S Cal L Rev 1877 at 1879. Feminist scholars have called attention to the fact that because 
“the masculine in law has been universalized and appears under the guise of impartiality and neutrality 
means that women’s perspectives are understood not as equally universal, but as particular, biased, 
special interests, not providing the degree of objectivity required for authoritative judgement”: 
Rosemary Hunter, “Contesting the Dominant Paradigm: Feminist Critiques of Liberal Legalism” in 
Vanessa E Munro, The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Taylor & Francis, 
2016) 13 at 15; see also Jeffrey M Shaman, “The Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?” (1995–
1996) 45 DePaul L Rev 605. 
85. The principle of judicial impartiality is embodied inter alia, in the Charter, supra note 76 at 
s. 11(d), which provides that any person charged with a criminal offence has the right to “a fair and 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.” For an administrative law example, see e.g. 
Imperial Oil Ltd v Quebec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58.
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What happens, then, if judicial analytics tools make ubiquitous 
information that calls judicial impartiality into question? What if a judicial 
analytics tool demonstrates statistically significant disparities in the way 
that Judge C—or indeed, judges throughout the justice system—grants bail 
to a racialized accused person or sentences a racialized person convicted 
of a certain crime, compared to white persons who are similarly situated? 
To be sure, such revelations will not be fundamentally new. Academic 
studies have demonstrated the effects on judicial decision-making of 
factors like race86 and gender.87 Members of racialized and other equity 
seeking groups know from years of lived experience that the legal system 
cannot be relied upon for fair and equal treatment.88 What will be new, in 
a world of mainstreamed judicial analytics, is that statistical information 
about judging and the differences in decision-making trends between 
judges will be widely and easily available to anyone, anywhere. 
It is also possible that judicial analytics tools will provide meaningful 
information about extra-legal factors that influence a particular judge’s 
decision-making. Studies have tracked the influence of factors including 
the weather, when a judge had their last snack break or even football game 
outcomes on judicial decision-making.89 If judicial analytics tools routinely 
86. There are numerous empirical studies from various jurisdictions that confirm that racialized 
persons experience worse outcomes at virtually every moment of the criminal justice process when 
compared to non-racialized offenders: see e.g. David Lammy, The Lammy Review: An independent 
review into the treatment of, and outcomes for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the 
Criminal Justice System (United Kingdom, 2017), online: <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643001/lammy-review-final-report.pdf> 
[https://perma.cc/QZT4-YZSP]; United States Sentencing Commission, Demographic Differences 
in Sentencing: An Update to the 2012 Booker Report (Washington: United States Sentencing 
Commission, 2017), online: <https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
research-publications/2017/20171114_Demographics.pdf> [https://perma.cc/E2PM-4CAH]; Report 
of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (Government of Manitoba, 1991), online: <http://www.
ajic.mb.ca/volumel/toc.html> [https://perma.cc/47XQ-EBRZ]; Katy M Colon, Philip R Kavanaugh, 
Don Hummer & Eileen M Ahlin (2018) “The impact of race and extra-legal factors in charging 
defendants with serious sexual assault: Findings from a five-year study of one Pennsylvania court 
jurisdiction” (2018) 16:2 Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice 99.
87. See e.g. Andrea L Miller, “Expertise Fails to Attenuate Gendered Biases in Judicial Decision-
Making” (2018) 10:2 Social Psychological and Personality Science 227.
88. See e.g. the discussion in Akwasi Owusu-Bempah & Scot Wortley, “Race, Crime and Criminal 
Justice in Canada” in Sandra Bucerius & Michael Tonry, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Ethnicity, 
Crime, and Immigration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
89. See e.g. Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, “Extraneous factors in judicial 
decisions” (2011) 108:17 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 6889, testing the legal realist trope that “justice is what the judge ate for breakfast” in the 
context of judges making sequential parole decisions in Israeli courts, and concluding at 6890 that “the 
likelihood of a favorable ruling is greater at the very beginning of the work day or after a food break 
than later in the sequence of cases.” For additional discussion of some of these studies, see Daniel L 
Chen, “Machine Learning and the Rule of Law” in Michael A Livermore & Daniel N Rockmore, eds, 
Law as Data: Computation, Text and the Future of Legal Analysis (The SFI Press Seminar Series, 
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provide reports showing that such factors meaningfully influence decision-
making, it will be difficult for a justice system committed to judicial 
impartiality and equality before the law to simply ignore this information. 
Public perceptions of judicial competence may also be changed. 
A judge is not required to have exhaustive, in-depth understanding of 
every area of law or every discipline relevant to each case they hear, but 
a certain level of competence is part of their professional obligations.90 
What if, for example, a judicial analytics tool performs an analysis of the 
language used in Judge D’s reasons and reveals that Judge D tends to rely 
on a particular legal test which, although not technically overturned, is 
not the leading legal test used by other judges in the jurisdiction? How 
about a tool that shows that in one region of Ontario, judicially determined 
reasonable notice periods in wrongful dismissal cases are on average 50 
per cent lower than in another jurisdiction, for similar cases? It is not clear 
that such results reveal, in fact, a lack of judicial competence. Judicial 
independence and the common law system accommodate a range of 
approaches. However, the public, upon having ready access to this type 
of information across a multitude of data points, might become skeptical 
about whether the legal system is yielding legally correct or fair decisions. 
To the extent that mainstreamed judicial analytics tools reveal 
significant and regular disparities in judicial practices, such revelations 
will be in tension with concepts of judicial impartiality, equality before the 
law and judicial competence. All of these ideals are core concepts in our 
justice system. A powerful set of narratives—and, indeed, case law—is 
built on the idea that the justice system, when operating properly, provides 
similar results in similar cases: we are all to be treated equally under the 
law. If judicial analytics tools provide ubiquitous information about how 
case outcomes are influenced by a litigant’s race or gender, by external 
issues like the weather, or by a judge’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the 
law, the justice system will be forced to respond to a questioning public.
2019), online: SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3302507> [https://perma.cc/DJ2T-3PBZ]. 
90. In the Matter of an Inquiry Pursuant to s. 63(1) of the Judges Act Regarding the Honourable 
Justice Robin Camp: Report and Recommendation of the Inquiry Committee to the Canadian Judicial 
Council (29 November 2016), online: Canadian Judicial Council <https://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/
general/Camp_Docs/2016-11-29%20CJC%20Camp%20Inquiry%20Committee%20Report.pdf> 
[https://perma.cc/USK8-DD3A]: (the committee opined, “[j]udges cannot reasonably be expected to 
have expertise in every discipline…which is precisely why expert witnesses are often called to assist 
the judicial reasoning process” at para 165); see also Alice Woolley, “When Judicial Decisions Go 
from Wrong to Wrongful—How Should the Legal System Respond?” (3 November 2015), online: 
ABlawg.ca <https://ablawg.ca/2015/11/03/when-judicial-decisions-go-from-wrong-to-wrongful-
how-should-the-legal-system-respond/> [https://perma.cc/RR5E-7R45].
Judging by Numbers:  Judicial Analytics, the Justice System 269
and its Stakeholders
It is not clear what responses may be triggered but there are a number 
of interesting possibilities. Will increased transparency into the work of 
judges result in wide-spread reforms that respond to what becomes known 
about judicial behaviour? Will the justice system have to reconsider its 
deeply held commitments to judicial integrity and adopt a new ideal of the 
judicial role? Will emerging concerns about human fallibility be used to 
justify increased use of automated decision-making in judicial contexts? 
Will easy access to data about judges simply result in “virtuosity in 
measuring and comparing quantifiable variables...rather than an earnest 
effort to advance our understanding” about judicial behaviour?91 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that increased transparency 
is not a guaranteed result of greater access to judicial analytics tools. 
Whether mainstreamed judicial analytics tools will lead to better public 
insight about judging depends on both: (1) the quality of the information 
that the tools output; and (2) the literacy of judicial analytics users. 
Here, we can think of “quality” in several different respects. One 
facet of quality is the quality of the data that is inputted into the tools. 
Above, we noted the ways that the data set used by judicial analytics tools 
may be incomplete and, in some cases, contain errors. However, even if 
the highest quality data is inputted into the tools, this does not guarantee 
that the information outputted by such tools is of a high quality. Stated 
simply, it is possible for judicial analytics tools to be based on poorly or 
incorrectly written code. If the numbers aren’t “crunched” correctly, then 
the information reported by an analytics tool to the public about judicial 
behaviour may be inaccurate. To date, the issue of quality has not been 
prominent in the conversation about judicial analytics. High barriers to 
entry into the market have generally meant that only serious and well-
funded actors are able to produce and provide such tools.92 However, 
if judicial analytics tools become mainstreamed, as we predict, and are 
cheaper to create and deliver, there is more risk of poorly developed tools.
Moreover, even if the best data is inputted and analyzed correctly, user 
misunderstandings can still result if statistical information is not presented 
with sufficient context. For example, a judicial analytics tool could report 
that Judge E has a record of denying bail to racialized individuals accused 
of crimes in 80 per cent of cases, in contrast to their colleagues who deny 
bail to racialized individuals in 50 per cent to 60 per cent of cases. If a 
91. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political 
Thought (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1978) at 7.
92. The providers of some of the most prominent tools—LexisNexis, Westlaw and Bloomberg—are 
all very large companies.
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member of the public is simply given these two numbers, that person might 
be concerned about the fairness of Judge E adjudicating bail decisions 
involving racialized individuals. But these two numbers do not tell the 
whole story. Proper interpretation of statistics depends on knowing the full 
context including, for example, whether Judge E is newly appointed and 
has only presided over five bail hearings versus their colleagues, who have 
presided over an average of 300 hearings each. 
Similarly, an analytics tool may show that Judge F has a higher rate 
of dissent than their colleagues at the same court or level of court. Absent 
further context, and without a clear understanding of the meaning of 
judicial dissent and its role in our judicial system, a member of the public 
may interpret this to mean that Judge F is aberrant, or incompetent, when 
in fact we know that dissent plays a critical role in our justice system and 
is by no means a reflection of the fitness of a dissenting judge.93 When 
patterns about judicial behaviour are presented by academics, they are 
likely to be accompanied by pages of explanatory text and context.94 The 
challenge with analytics tools meant for public use is that there is much 
more incentive to present users with a quickly digestible “bottom-line” 
statistical percentage or other numerical value, without the necessary 
context.
To summarize, a key potential benefit for the public of mainstreamed 
judicial analytics tools is increased transparency about judicial behaviour, 
but this is neither a guaranteed nor uncomplicated benefit. Issues of 
information quality and user literacy exist. To the extent that those practical 
issues can be addressed, the resulting transparency about the work of judges 
is likely to generate systemic challenges to the legal system’s commitments 
to judicial impartiality, equality before the law, and judicial competence. 
If the legal system cannot rise to these challenges, the public’s confidence 
in the administration of justice may suffer. On the flip side, the disruption 
that judicial analytics tools may invite to entrenched presumptions about 
the work of judging could provide new and profound avenues to improve 
our processes and our understanding of the judicial role with a view to 
improving Canadians’ access to fair and equal justice.
93. On the role and importance of dissent see e.g. Peter W Hogg & Ravi Amarnath, “Why Judges 
Should Dissent” (2017) 67:2 UTLJ 126; Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of 
the Future?” (2000) 38:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 495.
94. See Rehaag, “Revisiting Refugee Determinations,” supra note 30; Rehaag, “Refugee 
Determinations,” supra note 33.
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2. The judiciary
Increased transparency about judicial behaviour is also likely to have direct 
effects on judges themselves and on the work of judging. In this section, 
we explore opportunities for judicial education as a potential benefit of 
judicial analytics. We also caution that increased attention to the details of 
judicial behaviour may influence the work of judging and the well-being 
of judges in unintended ways and may have disparate consequences for 
certain judges.
Just as mainstreamed judicial analytics tools may provide better 
information to the public about judicial practices, they may also provide 
useful insights to judges about themselves. Reports from judicial analytics 
tools have the potential to reveal patterns in a judge’s work about which 
that judge might be otherwise unaware.95 Judges can use this information 
for self-reflection and seek to improve on their practices, where analytics 
suggest that is necessary. Indeed, the European ethical Charter on the 
use of Artificial Intelligence in judicial systems and their environment 
recognizes that judicial analytics tools could be beneficial to the extent 
that they “offer[] judges a more detailed quantitative and qualitative 
assessment of their activities…with a purely informative aim of assisting 
in decision-making.”96 Of course, whether such benefits result from 
mainstreamed judicial analytics will depend again on the quality of the 
reports produced by judicial analytics tools and the ability of judges to 
translate the information presented in those reports into meaningful 
changes to their professional practices. Additionally, judges need to be 
receptive to the information available to them. 
Not all of the changes in judicial practices that analytics tools might 
motivate are positive. It seems possible, for example, that judges could try 
to game the system in order to improve their analytics scores. While we 
might want a judge to change their behaviour if confronted with material 
evidence of unfairness or bias in their decisions, what about other types of 
behavioural changes? Studies have demonstrated that in the United States, 
“federal judges adapt their behavior to specific audiences” and alter their 
judicial decision-making in the name of advancing their careers.97 What if 
95. For further discussion on using judicial analytics to educate judges, see e.g. Chen, supra note 89.
96. European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, European ethical Charter on the use of 
Artificial Intelligence in judicial systems and their environment, Adopted at the 31st plenary meeting 
of the CEPEJ, Strasbourg, 3-4 December 2018 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe: 2019), online: 
<https://rm.coe.int/ethical-charter-en-for-publication-4-december-2018/16808f699c> [https://perma.
cc/5ZK8-5VXT] at 66. 
97. Ryan C Black & Ryan J Owens, “Courting the President: How Circuit Court Judges Alter their 
Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court” (2016) 60:1 American Journal of Political Science 
30, show that when there is a vacancy on the United States Supreme Court, judges contending for 
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judges injected their decisions with a search engine optimization (SEO)-
like strategy where specific words, phrases or cases are used to produce 
decisions that would be viewed more favourably in a judicial analytics 
report? This kind of strategizing could seriously undermine the integrity 
of judicial decision-making. 
Beyond cynical concerns about judges modifying their behaviour for 
career advancement or improved analytics stats, there are subtler—and 
more likely—risks. Although judges are insulated by judicial independence, 
the desire to conform can be a powerful influence on behaviour.98 For 
instance, if a judicial analytics tool indicates that Judge G’s record is 
“abnormal” in some regard in comparison to their colleagues, Judge G 
may consciously or unconsciously be moved to change course and render 
decisions more in line with their colleagues. Whether conformity in any 
given case is a good or bad thing is a complicated question that depends 
on the facts of a case, the nature of the law at issue and one’s view of the 
proper role of judging in a common law system. Our point here is simply 
that the information produced by judicial analytics tools may impact the 
judicial decision-making process in myriad ways.
Another perspective through which to consider the impact of judicial 
analytics tools on judges is as a new form of workplace surveillance. To be 
sure, judges in Canada are no strangers to scrutiny of their work; appellate 
courts, the press and the academy routinely review and critique judicial 
decisions. To the extent, however, that the inputs into judicial analytics 
tools come to include video and audio of court proceedings, a more intense 
level of scrutiny may well result. Statistical analyses of judges’ in-court 
behaviour have been performed before, primarily by academics and with 
the use of significant resources. For example, in 1978, two academics 
conducted a study of judges’ non-verbal behaviour in courtrooms; 
specifically, they recorded the number of times judges gazed for more 
or less than two seconds at defendants, civilian witnesses, and police 
witnesses by having observers sit in court and observe 138 witnesses 
over a two-month period.99 Much of the resulting analysis focused on 
elevation to the Supreme Court are more likely to “vote consistently with the president’s preferences, 
to rule in favor of the United States and to write dissenting opinions” when compared to judges who 
are not contenders for promotion to the Supreme Court. 
98.  Cass R Sunstein, “Conformity and Dissent” (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper No. 34, 2002) at 14 (citations omitted), online: <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&context=public_law_and_legal_theory> [https://perma.cc/DJK7-
KYC2].
99. Edwina Dorch & Gary Fontaine, “Rate of Judges’ Gaze at Different Types of Witnesses” (1978) 
46:3 Perceptual and Motor Skills 1103. 
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differences in how long Black and white judges looked at certain classes 
of witnesses.100 
Mainstreamed judicial analytics tools could someday have the potential 
to produce this kind of behavioural information routinely and with little 
cost. If so, judges will be entering a new world of surveillance—arguably 
a world of hyper-surveillance—much different than they have experienced 
before.101 Recent commentary and studies have emphasized how increased 
workplace surveillance can lead to negative effects on workers’ subjective 
sense of wellbeing and can lead to unintended behaviours such as attempts 
to hide one’s work from the surveillance system where possible.102 How 
such effects might manifest in relation to surveilling judges’ work in the 
courtroom is hard to predict, but it seems reasonable to be concerned about 
the risk of unintended and potentially negative effects. 
Framing judicial analytics tools as a form of surveillance highlights 
another risk: scrutiny facilitated by judicial analytics tools will be used in a 
disproportionately punitive fashion against racialized and other “outsider 
judges.”103 In the social sciences, there is a rich literature demonstrating 
the many ways that differently-situated “people are exposed differently to 
the dangers of surveillance.”104 There are numerous examples of intense 
scrutiny of racialized judges who reference or challenge racism in the 
legal system.105 Might new judicial surveillance technologies (i.e. judicial 
100. The researchers, ibid at 1103, reported their results “indicate: (1) a main effect for judges’ race 
with a higher rate of gaze from white judges than [B]lack judges, (2) a main effect for type of witness 
with defendants receiving the highest rate of gaze followed by civilian, then police, witnesses, (3) an 
interaction of judges’ race by type of witness with white judges gazing at the highest rate at police and 
black judges gazing at the lowest rate at police, (4) an interaction of judges’ race by witnesses’ race 
with black judges gazing at the highest rate at white witnesses and white judges at the highest rate at 
black witnesses, (5) a positive correlation of 0.48 between the rate of gaze at the defendant and the fine 
received if found guilty.” 
101. Sarah Griffiths, “Hyper-surveillance” (21 July 2019), online: Worklife 101 <https://www.bbc.
com/worklife/article/20190718-hyper-surveillance> [https://perma.cc/B4WS-SXV2]. 
102. Anna Borg, “Impact of electronic surveillance in the workplace” (31 July 2014), online: 
Eurofound <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2014/impact-of-electronic-
surveillance-in-the-workplace> [https://perma.cc/GAM8-DUFQ]. 
103. The authors thank Professor Jane Bailey for raising the issue explored in this paragraph. The 
idea of “outsider” judges draws on the work of Mari J Matsuda, “Public Response to Racist Speech: 
Considering the Victim’s Story” (1989) 87 Mich L Rev 2320 at 2323, who uses the phrase “outsider 
jurisprudence” to describe the academic work of feminist and racialized scholars; and from Natasha 
Bakht et al, “Counting Outsiders: A Critical Exploration of Outsider Course Enrollment in Canadian 
Legal Education” (2007) 45:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 667 at 672, who use the term “…outsider to describe 
those who are members of groups that have historically lacked power in society or have traditionally 
been outside the realms of fashioning, teaching, and adjudicating the law.” 
104. Ruha Benjamin, Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2019).
105. See e.g. the allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias against African-Canadian Judge 
Corinne Sparks in: R v S(RD), supra note 83; and associated commentary: Sherene Razack, “RDS 
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analytics tools) be “weaponized” in a way that results in disproportionately 
negative impacts on racialized and other “outsider judges”? This possibility 
demands our attention.
A final possible effect worthy of consideration relates to judicial 
competence. If information produced by judicial analytics tools is 
increasingly used as evidence in legal proceedings—for example, if parties 
begin to bring judicial disqualification motions on the basis of reports 
produced by judicial analytics tools—will this impose new competence 
requirements on judges? What level of understanding will judges need 
to have about these tools—for instance, what the tools do, the pitfalls of 
analytics, etc.—in order to preside over such motions? Even if evidence 
created by judicial analytics tools is submitted through experts, judges 
will need to have a basic degree of familiarity with analytics tools to 
meaningfully assess the evidence. Some commentators have argued that 
judges should be subject to a duty of technological competence.106 Indeed, 
proposed revisions to the Canadian Judicial Council’s Ethical Principles 
for Judges state that “judges should develop and maintain some proficiency 
with technology related to the nature and performance of judicial duties.”107 
The ability of judges to scrutinize statistics and conclusions generated by 
judicial analytics tools seems particularly important given that, as noted 
above, this information is prone to being misunderstood or taken out of 
context.
Just as mainstreamed judicial analytics is likely to alter how the 
public sees the work of judging, this technology is also poised to change 
how judges themselves see the work they do. A key potential benefit for 
judges is educative; with better information about judicial behaviours, 
judges can work to address undesirable behaviours, like implicit bias. At 
the same time, this increased insight also carries risks that judges might 
v Her Majesty the Queen: A Case About Home” (1998) 9:3 Constitutional Forum; and Richard F 
Devlin, “We Can’t Go on Together with Suspicious Minds: Judicial Bias and Racialized Perspective 
in R v RDS” (1995) 18 Dalhousie LJ 408. See also a recent example from the UK: Peter Herbert, “UK 




106. See e.g. Amy Salyzyn, “Modern Courts and the Need for Judicial Technological Competence” 
(18 June 2019), online: Slaw.ca <http://www.slaw.ca/2019/06/18/modern-courts-and-the-need-for-
judicial-technological-competence/> [https://perma.cc/3N7M-92GU]; and Robert Ambrogi, “It’s 
Time to Extend the Duty of Tech Competence to Judges” (6 May 2019), online: Above the Law 
<https://abovethelaw.com/2019/05/it-is-time-to-extend-the-duty-of-tech-competence-to-judges/> 
[https://perma.cc/X7UU-ZPL6].
107. Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges: Discussion Draft, November 20, 2019, 
online (pdf): <https://cjc-ccm.ca/sites/default/files/documents/2019/EPJ%20-%20PDJ%202019-11-
20.pdf> [https://perma.cc/XW3K-L5CG] at 3.C.4.
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intentionally or unintentionally alter their behaviours in undesirable ways. 
Additionally, the surveillance necessary to produce analytics-generated 
insights could have negative impacts on the well-being of judges or be 
disproportionately deployed against certain groups of judges. If and how 
these effects might manifest in a world of mainstreamed judicial analytics 
is uncertain. Clearer is the fact that judges will unlikely be able to ignore 
this technology completely, as it becomes more routinely referenced on 
matters that they must adjudicate. 
3. Lawyers
Likewise, lawyers—or at least litigators—will not be able to ignore judicial 
analytics tools if and when this technology becomes mainstreamed. This 
section focuses on how judicial analytics tools may engage lawyers’ 
professional obligations.
The potential consequences for lawyers relate primarily to competence. 
The Federation of Law Societies of Canada’s Model Code of Professional 
Conduct includes commentary noting that a lawyer’s duty of competence 
requires “an understanding of, and ability to use, technology relevant to 
the nature and area of the lawyer’s practice and responsibilities.”108 There 
is no detailed list of the kinds of technology a lawyer must use competently 
to fulfill this obligation. Rather, the duty is expressly contextual, with 
the relevant commentary referring only to an obligation to use such 
technology that is “relevant to the nature and area of the lawyer’s practice 
and responsibilities” and which is “reasonably available.”109 This language 
echoes the well-settled standard of care in a negligence action against a 
lawyer, which is that of the “reasonably competent” lawyer.110 
If clients are in a situation where they have the ability to choose 
their judge or bring a motion to have an assigned judge disqualified, and 
judicial analytics tools can produce relevant information, then the use of 
judicial analytics has a clear benefit to these clients. As judicial analytics 
tools become ubiquitous, they will presumably become “relevant” and 
“reasonably available” to litigators such that there is an obligation to use 
such tools, pursuant to both professional codes of conduct and common 
law standards of care. 
An analogy can be drawn to using electronic databases to conduct 
legal research. Several decades ago, it was accepted practice for lawyers 
108. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct at Rule 3.1-2, 
Commentary 4A, online: <https://flsc.ca/interactivecode/> [https://perma.cc/4KB4-PDX5#code-0_1] 
[Model Code].
109. Ibid at Commentary 4B.
110. See Central Trust Co v Rafuse, [1986] 2 SCR 147 at para 58 31 DLR (4th) 481.
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to rely on print case reporters; now, a failure to use electronic databases 
to conduct legal research can amount to lawyer incompetence.111 The tools 
that lawyers are expected to use to provide competent client representation 
evolve as the available technologies expand and become more widely 
used. Although clients and courts do not now expect lawyers to employ 
judicial analytics tools, this may change.112 
A related question concerns the kinds of ethical obligations, if any, 
lawyers might have in relying on or presenting statistics about an individual 
judge in court. Current rules impose a duty on lawyers to “encourage 
public respect for and try to improve the administration of justice.”113 
Commentary to this duty explicitly notes that “proceedings and decisions 
of courts and tribunals are properly subject to scrutiny and criticism by all 
members of the public, including lawyers” while also cautioning lawyers 
to “avoid criticism that is petty, intemperate or unsupported by a bona 
fide belief in its real merit.”114 This rule and its commentary were drafted 
without judicial analytics tools in mind. Does the rise of analytics tools 
generate new or unique tensions with lawyers’ ethical obligations? For 
example, should there be a certain standard that a judicial analytics tool 
must meet before information from that tool can be presented as evidence 
in open court (and, thus made part of the public record)?
Similarly, should there be any restraints on how lawyers refer to 
information from analytics tools in speaking with the media? Lawyers are 
permitted under current rules to speak to the media about a client’s case if 
it is “in the best interests of the client and in the scope of the retainer” and 
does not otherwise interfere with a party’s right to a fair trial or hearing.115 
111. In Aram Systems Ltd v NovAtel Inc, 2010 ABQB 152 at para 23 CanLII, a trial court in Alberta 
described the shift in the following terms: 
…I think that the view of computerized legal research as a mere alternative is no longer 
consonant with the reality of current legal practice. Such research is now expected of 
counsel, both by their clients, who look to counsel to put forth the best possible case, 
and by the courts, who rely upon counsel to present the most relevant authorities. Indeed, 
it might be argued that a lawyer who chooses to forgo computerized legal research is 
negligent in doing so….The practice of law has evolved to the point where computerized 
legal research is no longer a matter of choice.
112. Ed Walters, “The Model Rules of Autonomous Conduct: Ethical Responsibilities of Lawyers and 
Artificial Intelligence” (2019) 35 Georgia State U L Rev 1073 at 1078, citing in part James Summers, 
“Professional and Ethical Traps for Technophobes and Technoweenies” (January 2004), online 
(pdf): Mem B Ass’n J <http://www.allensummers.com/sites/396/uploaded/files/Professional_Traps_
Jan_2004.pdf> [https://perma.cc/EE4S-EE2S], writes: “Many lawyers are just learning about [new 
artificial intelligence tools available to lawyers, including judicial analytics tools] for the first time, 
but if they are not yet the state of the art in legal-service delivery, it is clear that they soon will be the 
‘standard of competent practitioners.’”
113. Model Code, supra note 108 at r. 5.6-1.
114. Ibid at r. 5.6-1, Commentary [3].
115. Ibid at r. 7.5-1 and r. 7.5-2.
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Could a defence lawyer hold a press conference after her client is convicted 
and sentenced in a criminal matter, in which they refer to information from 
a judicial analytics tool that suggests that the trial judge has a history of 
bias against individuals belonging to the same community as the lawyer’s 
client? Assuming that the lawyer’s tone was professional, such comments 
would not necessarily be “petty, intemperate or unsupported by a bona fide 
belief in its real merit” and thus discouraged by the current rule requiring 
lawyers to encourage public respect for the administration of justice.116 
Could judicial analytics become part of a lawyer’s media strategy? 
As was the case with the public and the judiciary, the legal profession 
will face opportunities and challenges when judicial analytics tools 
become mainstreamed. Most importantly, lawyers will have to understand 
how to use these tools to benefit clients in ways that are consistent with 
their professional obligations in relation to the administration of justice. 
V. Responses to judicial analytics 
The above discussion details a variety of potential consequences of 
mainstreamed judicial analytics. Potential benefits of mainstreamed 
judicial analytics include increased transparency about judicial behaviour 
and new opportunities for judicial education. Risks associated with the 
mainstreaming of judicial analytics include the development of poor-
quality tools and negative effects on judges or certain groups of judges as 
a result of increased surveillance. 
This final part briefly explores possible responses to these potential 
consequences from a policy standpoint. We frame this discussion through 
two questions: (1) should judicial analytics tools be regulated? and (2) how 
should judicial regulators respond to mainstreamed judicial analytics?
1. Should judicial analytics tools be regulated?
As noted in the introduction, we do not believe that a French-style ban 
would be appropriate in Canada: the public should be able to analyze 
public information. Canadian researchers would rightfully sound the 
alarm if the government prohibited them from analyzing patterns in 
judicial decisions using conventional (i.e. non-analytics-based) methods; 
the fact that such analyses may be easier to do with judicial analytics tools 
does not change the essential nature of the task, it just makes it faster 
and potentially yields additional insights. There is also the question of the 
legality of banning analytics, since prohibiting the publication of patterns 
116. Ibid. 
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in otherwise public information would seem to run afoul of the freedom of 
expression guarantee in the Charter.117
In addition to these normative and legal reasons against a ban, there 
are also reasons why we might want to encourage the development and use 
of judicial analytics tools. As discussed in Part IV, above, judicial analytics 
tools have the potential to facilitate unprecedented transparency about the 
work of judging in Canada, which is undoubtedly a good worth pursuing. 
So, if not a ban on judicial analytics, is some type of regulatory 
response prudent? Given the potential development of poor-quality tools, 
a risk identified above, one reason to regulate judicial analytics tools could 
be to provide some type of quality assurance. If judicial analytics are 
mainstreamed and the public has easy access, it will be important that the 
information that the public receives is accurate and otherwise trustworthy, 
which requires that the tools that produce analytics reports are reliable.
There are several reasons, however, that a regulatory regime may not 
be the best vehicle for addressing quality assurance issues. First, it is not 
clear who should serve as the regulator of judicial analytics. There is an 
ongoing debate about whether lawyer regulators—law societies, in Canada 
—have jurisdiction to regulate legal technology products.118 Historically, 
this debate has been framed in terms of whether a technology tool simply 
provides legal information (and thus is not within the jurisdictional ambit 
of lawyer regulators) or whether it provides a legal service or provides 
advice that amounts to the practice of law. Given that judicial analytics 
tools, which amalgamate and report statistical information about a judge’s 
past decisions, are not providing legal services, answering legal questions, 
or acting as “robot lawyers” before a court or tribunal, law societies do not 
have a plausible jurisdictional claim to regulate them. 
What about the government? Existing consumer protection laws might 
provide some defense against particularly egregious issues arising from 
poor-quality analytics tools but are not well placed to facilitate proactive 
measures of quality assurance.119 Another option might be for legislators 
to pass a new, targeted law tailored to the specifics of judicial analytics. 
In July 2019, California passed a law requiring “chatbots” to disclose that 
they are not human.120 Rather than create a new regulator, the California 
117. Charter, supra note 76 at s 2(b).
118. See e.g. the discussion in Teresa Scassa et al, “Developing Privacy Best Practices for Direct-to-
Public Legal Apps: Observations and Lessons Learned, (2020) 18(1) CJLT [forthcoming].
119. For example, s 9(1) of Ontario’s Consumer Protection Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 30, Sched A: 
a supplier “is deemed to warrant that the services supplied under a consumer agreement are of a 
reasonably acceptable quality.”
120. For more details, see Renee DiResta, “A New Law Makes Bots Identify Themselves—That’s the 
Problem” (24 July 2019), online: Wired.com <https://www.wired.com/story/law-makes-bots-identify-
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law allows the Attorney General to enforce and seek civil penalties under 
existing consumer protection laws.121 However, regulating the quality of 
diverse judicial analytics tools is doubtless a more complicated endeavour 
than simply requiring a disclosure notice, as with the California chatbot 
law. The complexity involved raises questions about whether government 
regulation is sufficiently nimble and appropriately informed about judicial 
analytics to be effective. 
Additionally, questions about constitutionality linger in the 
government regulation space, even if such regulation does not amount to 
a full ban. As emphasized above, the function of judicial analytics tools is 
to provide descriptive analyses of publicly available data; once the data is 
made public through the publication of judicial decisions and other court 
records, it seems like government overreach to try to control the specifics 
of how that information can be used. 
Finally, even if a proportionate government regime passed constitutional 
scrutiny, it is not clear that there would be government appetite to enter the 
regulatory fray. Judicial analytics tools—even if they are “mainstreamed,” 
as we predict they will be—are still a niche technological market. This is 
unlike, for example, new technologies with broader reach, like drones or 
autonomous vehicles, which are much more likely to attract government 
attention.
One quality assurance option outside of the regulatory landscape 
that is often discussed in the context of legal technologies is voluntary 
third-party certification.122 This method would convene a group of experts 
to develop appropriate standards and procedures to evaluate the quality 
of judicial analytics tools. Providers of judicial analytics tools could be 
incentivized to participate in the certification process with the promise of 
being able to use a trustmark if they meet the required standards. The value 
of a trustmark to legal technology providers is the ability to easily signal 
to the public that they are providing a high-quality tool. The public would 
also benefit from this signalling: they could quickly distinguish which 
judicial analytics tools have met certain standards and which have not. 
Although not commonly employed in the legal sector, the concept of 
industry standards and private certification is well developed in other fields. 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) for example, “has 
published 23037 international standards and related documents, covering 
themselves/> [https://perma.cc/YQV8-9K2B].
121. Ibid.
122. See e.g. discussion in Susan Saab Fortney, “Online Legal Document Providers and the Public 
Interest: Using a Certification Approach to Balance Access to Justice and Public Protection” (2019) 72 
Oklahoma L Rev 91; and Scassa et al, supra note 118. 
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almost every industry, from technology, to food safety, to agriculture and 
healthcare.”123 In the area of technology, the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards Association is also active, with 
a “portfolio of over 1,900 active standards and over 650 standards under 
development.”124 
A major downside to the case for private certification is cost. Although 
the market in judicial analytics tools is likely to grow, it is not a large market, 
relatively speaking. A private certification model specifically tailored 
to judicial analytics tools may well not be economically sustainable. If 
certification is expensive, it may not make economic sense for a provider 
to pursue a trustmark. Likewise, if only providers of high-end, expensive 
tools can afford certification, then it may only be lawyers or institutional 
users who will benefit from this model of quality assurance, as opposed to 
the general public.
We tend to favour a public model: a non-profit legal organization 
should develop high quality, free judicial analytics tools for public use. 
In Canada, we have precedents for this model in the contexts of both 
legal documents and legal information. With respect to legal documents, 
there have long been commercial providers who marketed electronic legal 
forms to the public with a view to making the forms more accessible 
and user friendly.125 Increasingly, however, non-profit organizations and 
courts are developing their own free versions of electronic, interactive 
legal documents.126 Regarding legal information, although Canadians 
have access to commercial legal research databases like Westlaw and 
LexisNexis, we also benefit from the Canadian Legal Information Institute 
(CanLII), which is funded by Canadian lawyers and notaries and provides 
free, public access to Canadian jurisprudence and legislation.127 
123. “About ISO,” online: The International Organization for Standardization < https://www.iso.org/
about-us.html> [https://perma.cc/8VCQ-FJXS].
124. The IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, Ethically Aligned 
Design: A Vision for Prioritizing Human Well-being with Autonomous and Intelligent Systems (First 




125. See e.g. Law Depot, <https://www.lawdepot.ca/> [https://perma.cc/47LU-C3AN].
126. See e.g. CLEO Family Law Guided Pathways, <https://stepstojustice.ca/family-law-guided-
pathways/about> [https://perma.cc/SA8H-97PF]; and Legal Info Nova Scotia Wills App, <https://
www.legalinfo.org/apps/welcome-to-our-last-will-and-testament-app> [https://perma.cc/Q263-
PVMV].
127. “What’s CanLII?,” online: CanLII <https://www.canlii.org/en/info/about.html> [https://perma.
cc/B54M-PGXR].
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A public model delinks quality assurance from commercial incentives 
and provides a free, trusted option that is available to everyone. The 
degree to which this might be a realistic approach for judicial analytics 
tools depends on whether, in future, the creation of such tools becomes 
less resource-intensive. The cost of developing or maintaining a public 
judicial analytics tool may be too high to be appealing or even possible to 
pursue. If costs were reduced, however, a public option is an interesting 
possibility. 
2. How should judicial regulators respond to mainstreamed judicial 
analytics?
Concerns about judicial impartiality and competence arising from 
mainstreamed judicial analytics may also engage judicial regulators. 
Judicial regulators could play an important role in helping to harness 
the potential educative benefits of judicial analytics tools and protecting 
judges from some of the negative impacts of increased scrutiny. 
As detailed in Part IV above, concerns about judicial impartiality can 
be addressed within individual legal cases when a party makes a motion 
to have a judge disqualified for a reasonable apprehension of bias. But 
judicial councils in Canada also play an important role in addressing 
public concerns about judicial impartiality and judicial competence. More 
particularly, these councils are authorized “to receive and investigate 
complaints against judges, to hold discipline hearings, and recommend or 
impose discipline on judges.”128 How should this authority be exercised 
if judicial councils receive complaints about judges based on a pattern of 
bias or incompetence gleaned from a judicial analytics tool?
In certain respects, addressing complaints based on data from judicial 
analytics tools need not be any different than addressing other types of 
complaints. An initial step is to determine the validity of the information 
contained in the complaint. In the case of complaints based on information 
from judicial analytics tools, this requires the regulator to be able to assess 
the veracity of that information. Assuming that the regulator can be assured 
of the quality of the information generated by the tool—whether through 
regulatory standards, a certification regime, a trusted public source or its 
own independent assessment—then the question becomes how should a 
regulator react when judicial analytics tools reveal patterns suggesting 
judicial bias or incompetence? 
128. Richard Devlin & Adam Dodek, “’Fighting Words’: Regulating judges in Canada” in 
Richard Devlin & Adam Dodek, eds, Regulating Judges: Beyond Independence and Accountability 
(Massachusetts: Edwards Elgar Publishing, 2016) 76 at 89.
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Doing nothing is indefensible: if a judicial analytics tool provides 
credible information about problematic judging then a response is 
required to maintain public confidence in the judicial system. The fact that 
the information comes from a judicial analytics tool does not justify the 
regulator putting its head in the sand. At the same time, it will be important 
that judicial regulators react proportionately to such information. In many 
cases, it may be too extreme to remove a judge from the bench even if there 
are real problems in relation to the particular judge; targeted educational 
measures may be a more effective and fairer response.129 Indeed, Daniel 
Chen has suggested that judges could be offered targeted training programs 
“either with the goal of de-biasing or to help them learn how to use the 
hearing process to better advantage.”130 Chen also notes that “simply 
alerting judges to the fact that their behavior is highly predictable in ways 
that may indicate unfairness may be sufficient to change their behavior.”131 
In addition to interventions targeting individual judges, judicial 
councils or established judicial education institutions, like the National 
Judicial Institute,132 might undertake more proactive, general educative 
activities using information obtained from judicial analytics tools. For 
example, Chen also suggests that judicial education could be used “to 
expose judges to findings concerning the effects of legally relevant and 
legally irrelevant factors on decisions, with the goal of general rather than 
specific debiasing.”133 
Once again, any educational benefit inspired by a judicial analytics 
tool depends to a significant degree on how receptive a judge is to the 
insights offered by analytics. However, if this type of information is 
routinely included as part of judicial education efforts, it may be possible 
to engender more buy-in from individual judges. Such educative efforts 
could be directed not only to informing judges about insights generated 
by judicial analytics tools but also to educating judges about the tools 
themselves so that they are more knowledgeable and comfortable if and 
129. We recognize that not all judicial regulators in Canada have the authority to order this type of 
sanction. For example, the Canadian Judicial Council, which has authority over federally-appointed 
judges in Canada, is currently limited to recommending to the federal Minister of Justice that the judge 
be removed (Judges Act, RSC, 1985, c J-1, s 65(2)). That said, it has been argued that, in the case of the 
Canadian Judicial Council, the range of sanctions for misconduct short of removal should be expanded 
and hopefully we will see this type of reform in the near future. Moreover, some provincial judicial 
regulators of judges already have the power to order educational measures (Courts of Justice Act, RSO 
1990, Ch C43 at s 51.11).
130. Danziger, Levav & Avnaim-Pesso, supra note 89 at 5.
131. Ibid. 
132. “About the NJI,” online: National Judicial Institute <https://www.nji-inm.ca/index.cfm/about/
about-the-nji/> [https://perma.cc/A8W3-J9K7].
133. Ibid at 7.
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when results from judicial analytics tools are presented as evidence in 
court. 
In addition to education, are there other proactive ways for judicial 
regulators to address problems revealed by judicial analytics tools? One 
option might be to conduct performance evaluations informed, at least 
in part, by information provided by a judicial analytics tool. Judges are 
not subject to any formal evaluations in Canada,134 although in some 
cases, there is explicit statutory authority to do so.135 As Adam Dodek and 
Richard Devlin note in their review of the regulation of judges in Canada, 
performance evaluations can raise concerns about judicial independence, 
but “such objections would be significantly reduced—although not 
eliminated—if the evaluation was internal and confidential, i.e. performed 
by the Chief Justice or the Associate Chief Justice of the court.”136
Finally, we might consider the role that judges, collectively, could play 
in addressing some of the potentially negative impacts of judicial analytics 
tools. For example, to mitigate concerns about decontextualized statistics, 
the judiciary could amplify its public education efforts on the practice of 
judging and the role of the courts, so that certain types of statistics (for 
example, the rate at which an appellate judge dissents) are understood by 
the public in their proper context.137 Similarly, as a way of guarding against 
undue pressures to conform, judicial bodies could enhance their existing 
efforts to educate the public about the importance of judicial independence 
in our legal system.138
More challenging questions arise in relation to how judicial regulators 
might mitigate any negative impacts on the well-being of judges resulting 
from their being subjected to new and potentially invasive surveillance or 
guard against the deployment of judicial analytics tools to target racialized 
and other “outsider” judges.139 Being aware of these risks and educating 
judges about their potential is surely a good first step. Depending on the 
degree to which these risks manifest themselves, judicial regulators and 
134. See Devlin & Dodek, supra note 128 at 94: concluding, “[w]e are unaware of any formal 
evaluation processes of judges in Canada, at any level.”
135. For example, in Ontario, the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C43 at s 51.11 (1) provides: 
“The Chief Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice may establish a program of performance evaluation 
for provincial judges, and may implement the program when it has been reviewed and approved by the 
Judicial Council.”
136. Devlin & Dodek, supra note 128 at 94.
137. An example of a current initiative is the “Judges in Canada” Youtube Channel which is 
maintained by the Canadian Superior Courts Judges Association, online: YouTube <https://www.
youtube.com/channel/UCmZ-ODLaJDDQjXmqWLKuu_Q/about> [https://perma.cc/2L8Z-HSPN].
138. See e.g. “Judicial Independence,” online: Canadian Judicial Council <https://cjc-ccm.ca/en/
what-we-do/judicial-independence> [https://perma.cc/5JBL-9WBG].
139. Matsuda, supra note 103; Bakht et al, supra note 103.
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other judicial bodies—like judges’ associations—may need to take steps to 
defend judges’ privacy and equality interests, even where doing so surfaces 
tensions with commitments to open courts and judicial transparency.
Conclusion
Judicial analytics tools should not be banned in Canada. Prohibiting analysis 
of public information about judges is overbroad and inconsistent with our 
commitments to open courts and freedom of expression. Moreover, to the 
extent that analytics can encourage more transparency about the work 
of judging, the technology may contribute to: (1) improving the work 
of judges; (2) democratizing information about judges and courts; and 
(3) increasing civic engagement with the legal system. Yet, as with any new 
technology, there are likely to be unintended consequences that accompany 
the rise of judicial analytics. These necessitate careful consideration and 
response. 
In this article, we presented a preliminary exploration of some of the 
likely effects of mainstreamed judicial analytics for the public, lawyers and 
the judiciary. We also considered responses that might mitigate concerns 
related to the quality of judicial analytics tools and queried how judicial 
regulators might use information from these tools in their work. While 
only time will tell how the rise of judicial analytics will change the legal 
system and impact its stakeholders, what is certain is that analytics will 
continue to influence the delivery of legal services, the work of judges and 
the public’s interaction with the legal system in myriad ways. As we have 
argued in this article, this inevitability necessitates ongoing attention and 
analysis.  
